SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
Designed so the server stores ciphertext, not secrets.
Vault18 combines browser-side cryptography with authenticated AWS infrastructure, organization isolation, least-privilege sharing, and conservative browser-extension controls.
Zero-knowledge vault encryption
The browser derives a vault key from the master password with memory-hard Argon2id and encrypts vault data using AES-256-GCM authenticated encryption. The server receives a versioned encrypted envelope rather than the master password or plaintext records.
Account authentication and MFA
AWS Cognito handles account authentication independently from vault decryption. Authenticator-app MFA is required, but a successful account sign-in does not reveal the encrypted vault without the separate master password or user-held recovery key.
Organization and record isolation
API authorization binds operations to immutable Cognito subjects and organization membership. Shared records use recipient-specific wrapped encryption keys, while server-enforced roles limit viewing, editing, creation, sharing, and administration.
Conservative autofill
The browser extension offers credentials only for an exact match of scheme, hostname, and port. It avoids child-frame inspection, keeps synchronized vault data encrypted, and automatically locks decrypted sessions after inactivity.
Recovery without escrow
Recovery kits are generated for the user and are not emailed or retained as plaintext by Vault18. Without the correct master password or a previously saved recovery key, existing encrypted records cannot be decrypted.
Infrastructure controls
Vault18 uses HTTPS, restrictive content-security policies, CloudFront security controls, API throttling, private ciphertext storage, short-lived attachment transfers, audit events, and automated production security verification.
Responsible disclosure
Security researchers can report vulnerabilities confidentially to [email protected]. Do not include customer secrets or publicly disclose an unresolved issue.